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1. Introduction
During recent years quantum cryptography has been the object of a strong activity and rapid
progress [3, 4, 5], and it is now extending its activity into pre-competitive research [6] and into
commercial products [7]. Nevertheless, the fact that Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) could be an
interesting cryptographic primitive is often considered with scepticism by classical cryptographers
[8, 9, 10, 11]. Analysing the cryptographic implications of Quantum Key Distribution is indeed a
complex task. It requires a combination of knowledge that usually belongs to separate academic
communities, ranging from classical cryptography to the foundations of quantum mechanics and
network security. Very little work has so far been published on this global issue, even though [2]
should be considered as a pioneering contribution on thatmatter. Based on a thorough consultation
and discussion among the participants of the European project SECOQC [6], this review article
discusses how QKD can indeed be useful in cryptography, in addition to the scientifically well-
established classical cryptographic primitives. We also believe that very fruitful research, involving
the classical cryptography community and the quantum cryptography community, could emerge
in the future years and try to sketch what may be the next challenges in this direction.
The logical construction of the paper is based on the idea that QKD is a cryptographic primitive
that can be used for different purposes, of increasing complexity. We will distinguish three levels
of complexity, reflecting the first three layers of the OSI network model.
• The first level is Secret Key Agreement between two users sharing an initial small secret sym-
metric key1 and having access to a quantum channel (that can supposed fully accessible to
eavesdroppers). QKD, that could indeed be preferably called QKA (Quantum Key Agree-
ment), falls in the category of physical layer security cryptographic primitives.
• The second level is two-user Secure Payload Transmission built on top of a Key Agreement
scheme (secure link layer cryptographic primitive).
• The third level is Secure Key Distribution over a global network composed of multiple users
(network layer cryptographic primitive).
For each of these three cryptographic primitives, of increasing complexity level, we will give el-
ements allowing to compare QKD-based solutions with the alternative solutions that are currently
available, in the framework of classical cryptography. This paper is thus organized as follows: In
1a stronger requirement is to rely on an authenticated, but public classical channel, channel than can be obtained as soon
as the two users share a small secret symmetric key [24, 25].
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Section 2, we provide a survey of Secret Key Agreement techniques, and discuss some of their
strengths, weaknesses, and relative advantages. In Section 3, we discuss the security and the per-
formances of the different Secure Payload Transmission primitives that can be built on top of QKD,
and that can be used to secure a point-to-point communication link. In Section 4, we expose the
motivations for the development of QKD networks and provide a survey of the previous works on
QKD networks as well as a discussion of the possible interest of Secret Key Distribution schemes
based on QKD networks. Some major design decisions of the SECOQC QKD network are then
presented in section 5. Finally, in Section 6 we try to widen the scope of this review paper by dis-
cussing some future research directions that could benefit from active collaboration between the
quantum and the classical cryptography communities: the study of side-channels and of material
security, the study of post-quantum-computing cryptography, the use of QKD networks as a strong
building block for new network security protocols and the development of unified cryptographic
standards and evaluation methods for quantum and classical cryptography.
2. Secret Key Agreement
Cryptography has for a long time conformed to the idea that the techniques used to protect
sensitive data had themselves to be kept secret. Such principle, known as “cryptography by obscu-
rity” has however become inadequate in our modern era. Cryptography, that has developed as a
science in the 1970s and 1980s [94] allowed to move away from this historical picture and most of
the modern cryptographic systems are now based on publicly announced algorithms while their
security lies in the use of secret keys.
Distributing keys among a set of legitimate users while guaranteeing the secrecy of these keys
with respect to any potential opponent is thus a central issue in cryptography, known as the Secret
Key Agreement Problem.
There are currently five families of cryptographic methods that can be used to solve the Secret
Key Agreement Problem between distant users:
1. Classical Information-theoretic schemes
2. Classical computationally secure public-key cryptography
3. Classical computationally secure symmetric-key cryptographic schemes
4. Quantum Key Distribution
5. Trusted couriers
We will present how each of those cryptographic families can provide solutions to the Key Agree-
ment problem and discuss, in each case, the type of security that can be provided. We will also
consider a sixth type of Secret Key Agreement schemes: hybrid schemes built by combining some
of the methods listed above.
2.1. Classical Information-Theoretic Secret Key Agreement Schemes
A crypto-system is information-theoretically secure if its security derives purely from infor-
mation theory. That is, it makes no unproven assumptions on the hardness of some mathematical
problems, and is hence secure even when the adversary has unbounded computing power. The ex-
pression “unconditional security” is a synonym of “information-theoretical security” and is more
widely used in the cryptographic literature.
Studying the question of Classical Information-Theoretic Secret Key Agreement (CITSKA) re-
quires us to go back to the foundations of information-theoretic security, which builds on Shan-
non’s notion of perfect secrecy [23]. In seminal papers, Wyner [64] and later Csiszàr and Körner
[65] prove that there exist channel codes guaranteeing both robustness to transmission errors and
an arbitrarily small degree of information leakage towards non-authorized parties eavesdropping
on the communications performed on the channel. CITSKA is thus possible in the wire-tap con-
figuration, as long as the legitimate users have access to a common source of randomness through
classical channels that are less noisy than the channel the eavesdropper has access to [65]. The
results obtained by Csiszàr and Körner generalize the framework in which CITSKA is possible:
they show that whenever two parties have in their possession correlated strings of classical data
that exhibit more correlation between them than with any string that could be in the possession of
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an eavesdropper, then information-theoretic secret key agreement is possible. As we shall see in
2.4, the use of a quantum channel and of an appropriate protocol is a practical solution in order to
obtain such correlated strings of classical data.
There are however also Secret Key Agreement schemes that can exploit the ideas developed
in [65] and that can be implemented within the framework of classical information theory. Such
CITSKA schemes however need to rely on some specific extra assumptions, limiting the power of
the eavesdropper in order to be information-theoretically secure. Christian Cachin and Ueli Mau-
rer [36] hence demonstrated that CITSKA is possible in the bounded-storage model, in which the
adversaries can only store a limited amount of data. Introducing the idea of advantage distillation,
Maurer later generalized the previous models and showed that CITSKA is possible over a wide
class of classical channels [66].
2.2. Classical Public-Key Cryptography and Secret Key Agreement
Public-key cryptography foundations rest on the difficulty of solving some mathematical prob-
lems for which no polynomial algorithms are known. The computing resources needed to solve
these problems become totally unreachable when long enough keys are used. Public-key crypto-
graphic systems thus rely onwhat is called “provable computational security”. Public-key cryptog-
raphy is however not unconditionally secure; the problems on which it is based are not intractable;
and in addition, their non-polynomial complexity has so far not been proven.
Public-key algorithms for encryption require two keys: a public and a private key, which form
a key pair. Algorithms are designed in such a way that anyone can encrypt a message using the
public key, while only the legitimate recipient, in possession of the private key, can decrypt the
message. Because of the asymmetry between the two users of a public-key crypto-system (one
holding the private key, and keeping it secret, while the other user only needs to know a public,
non-secret key, and worry about its authenticity), public-key cryptography is often referred to as
asymmetric cryptography.
Secret Key Agreement based on public-key cryptography. As shown by Whitfield Diffie and Martin
Hellman in 1976 [12], public-key cryptography can be used to establish a shared secret key over an
unprotected classical communication channel, without using a prior shared secret. It thus provides
a practical way to implement secret key distribution over open networks. Note however that, in
order to ensure the authenticity of the key distribution scheme, the two users have to rely on a
third trusted authority. This is the purpose of public-key infrastructure (PKI): a hierarchical infras-
tructure of trusted third parties that are issuing certificates for the users’ public keys, provided that
the users accept to rely on them (we basically don’t really have the choice in current Internet, in
absence of any other practical solution for secret key distribution).
Security of public-key cryptography . Current asymmetric classical encryption schemes, such as RSA,
are based on the difficulty to compute logarithms within a finite field. Today’s implementations of
RSA require to use private and public keys of at least 1024 bits, in order to offer a reasonable secu-
rity margin against the computational efforts of an eavesdropper 2, and asymmetric keys of 2048
bits are preferable [13, 14]. It is also important to note that most of the currently used public-key
cryptographic schemes (for example RSA) could be cracked in polynomial time with a quantum
computer: this results from Shor’s algorithm for discrete log and factoring, that has a complexity
of O(n3) [19]. It however seems possible to build alternative public-key cryptographic schemes
on problems that are known to resist polynomial cryptanalysis on a quantum computer, such as
lattice shortest vector problem [21, 93]. Such schemes are nevertheless much less practical than
RSA-like schemes. This topic is at the moment actively studied, in the framework of what is called
Post-Quantum Computing Cryptography [22], and we will discuss some implications of what re-
searchers already know in subsection 6.3.
2Under the unverified assumption that there is no eavesdropper that possesses some unexpectedly strong computational
power or knows better cryptanalysis techniques than the best published ones.
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Performance of public-key cryptography. Making the computations relative to the asymmetric cryp-
tographic protocols (over keys longer than 1024 bits) is a rather computational intensive and time-
consuming task. The performance of RSA-based key distribution implementations depends heav-
ily on hardware : for RSA 2048 implemented on a recent PC (Pentium IV with a 2.1 GHz processor
running under Windows XP), the computations needed for one key exchange (essentially one RSA
encryption and one decryption) take roughly 13 ms [33]. The same key exchange would be ap-
proximately 10 times faster (thus in the ms range) on dedicated coprocessors and 10 times slower
(in the time range of a few tens of a second) on smart card coprocessors [34]. Because of those rela-
tively low exchange rates, public-key cryptography is most commonly used solely for initial secret
session key distribution (in network protocols like SSL for example), and classical symmetric-key
cryptography is then generally used for symmetric encryption and/or authentication of data.
2.3. Classical Computationally Secure Symmetric-Key Cryptography and Secret Key Agreement
Symmetric-key cryptography refers to cryptography methods in which both the sender and
receiver share the same secret key. Symmetric-key encryption was the only kind of encryption
publicly known until the discovery of public-key cryptography in 1976 [12].
Symmetric-key ciphers are used to guarantee the secrecy of the encrypted messages. The mod-
ern study of symmetric-key ciphers relates mainly to the study of block ciphers and stream ciphers
and to their applications. AES is a block cipher that had been designed by a team of Belgium cryp-
tographers (Joan Daemen et Vincent Rijmen) and has been adopted as an encryption standard by
the US government (in replacement of DES). Block ciphers can be used to compute Message Au-
thentication Codes (MACs) and can thus also be used to guarantee integrity and authenticity of
messages. Stream ciphers, in contrast to the block ciphers, create an arbitrarily long stream of key
material, which is combined with the plaintext bit-by-bit or character-by-character, somewhat like
the One-Time-Pad. We will not consider stream ciphers in the remaining part of this sub-section,
since, unlike block ciphers, they cannot be easily used to perform Secret Key Agreement. Reference
[16] provides a very complete survey of classical computationally secure symmetric-key schemes.
Secret Key Agreement based on Classical Computationally Secure Symmetric-Key Cryptography . Secret
Key Agreement can be realised by making use of solely symmetric-key cryptographic primitives.
Indeed, the combination of a symmetric-key encryption scheme with a symmetric-key authentica-
tion scheme allows one to build a Secret Key Agreement primitive. Provided that an initial small
secret key is previously shared, symmetrically, by Alice and Bob, they can use a symmetric cipher
to encrypt messages. These messages (that can consist of random bit strings or not) will constitute
the next keys that can thus be shared securely between Alice and Bob. The initially shared symmet-
ric key material can be used to symmetrically compute (on Alice’s side) and check (on Bob’s side)
a message authentication tag, and thus guarantee the authenticity of the newly distributed secret
keys. As we shall see, only logn bits of secret keys are necessary to authenticate n bits of messages
in this context, therefore, only small initial secret keys are needed. Since Secret Key Agreement
based on symmetric-key cryptographic primitives always relies on pre-established (small) sym-
metric secrets, needed for authentication one has to call such Secret Key Agreement schemes Secret
Key Expansion schemes more than Secret Key Establishment schemes.
Security of Classical Computationally Secure Symmetric-Key-based Secret Key Agreement . The security
of Secret Key Agreement based on classical symmetric-key cryptography depends on the security
of the cryptographic primitives that are used, and on the composability of those cryptographic
primitives. Shannon has proven that there is no unconditionally secure encryption scheme which
requires less encryption key bits than the One-Time Pad [23]. This has a fundamental implication:
the number of bits of the encryption key needs to be at least as large as the entropy (in bits) of the
message to be encrypted if one wants to build an unconditionally secure scheme. Hence, if we con-
sider the possibility of building an unconditionally secure symmetric key expansion scheme, i.e.,
a method to symmetrically generate secret keys out of a short initial symmetric shared secret key,
the former results from Shannon imply that such a scheme is impossible to achieve in the frame-
work of classical cryptography. However, as we shall see in subsection 2.4, such a cryptographic
primitive is possible in a quantum cryptographic context.
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It is however possible to use classical symmetric-key encryption and authentication schemes,
that are not unconditionally secure, to build a Secret Key Agreement scheme. AES can for example
be used for symmetric-key encryption and can be also used to compute message authentication
codes (using AES-MAC). Note that the security model that applies to such symmetric-key classical
encryption schemes (symmetric-key block ciphers and stream ciphers) is not unconditional secu-
rity (the entropy of the key is smaller than the entropy of the message) and not even “provably
computationally security” (security based on some proven upper bounds or on some equivalence
between the complexity of the cryptanalysis of a given cipher and another well-studied problem3).
The security model that applies to classical symmetric-key cryptography can be called “practi-
cal computational security”: a cryptographic scheme is considered “practically computationally
secure” if the best-known attacks require too much resource (such as computation power, time,
memory) by an acceptable margin [16, 14].
There are no publicly known efficient quantum attacks on classical symmetric-key crypto-
graphic schemes and the cryptanalysis of symmetric-key classical cryptography on a quantum
computer reduces to exhaustive search. Here a quantum computer would thus still give an ad-
vantage: the complexity of exhaustive search in a unsorted database of N elements is of O(N) on
a classical computer but only of O(
√
N) on a quantum computer [35]. The complexity reduction
offered by Grover algorithm is only polynomial (as opposed to the super-polynomial complex-
ity reduction offered by Shor algorithm), and this implies that doubling the key size of would be
enough tomaintain (against quantum computers) the level of algorithmic complexity one currently
has today (against classical computers) for symmetric-key primitives.
Performances. In terms of performance, symmetric-key classical cryptography is much faster and
less computational intensive than asymmetric cryptography4. In terms of speed, there are now 128-
bit AES encryptors able to encrypt data at rates in the Gbit/s range [30, 31]. This is the reason why
it is widely preferred to use symmetric-key schemes for encryption and/or authentication over
currently deployed communication networks. AES is currently the chosen standard for symmetric-
key classical block ciphers.
Under the assumption that there exists no better way to break a symmetric-key cryptographic
scheme is exhaustive searchwithin the key space (assumption that will be discussed inmore details
in subsection 3.3) then, a symmetric key of 103 bits is roughly comparable, in terms of computa-
tional requirements, to a RSA key modulus of 2048 bits [14]. Note that doubling the length of a
symmetric key implies squaring the computational efforts needed for exhaustive search; on the
other hand, the computational efforts scale not as fast with key length in the case of asymmetric
cryptography (see [13, 14] for details).
2.4. Quantum Key Agreement - Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
Quantum Key Distribution, invented in 1984 by Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard [39], based
on some earlier ideas of Stephen Wiesner [40], is an quantum cryptographic alternative solution to
the Secret Key Agreement problem. In contrast to public-key cryptography, it has been proven
to be unconditionally secure, i.e., secure against any attack, even in the future, irrespectively of
the computing power or any other resources that may be used, including quantum computers
[41, 42, 69]. QKD security relies on the laws of quantum mechanics, and more specifically on
the fact that it is impossible to gain information about non-orthogonal quantum states without
perturbing these states [43]. This property can be used to establish a random key between two
users, commonly called Alice and Bob, and guarantee that the key is perfectly secret5 to any third
party eavesdropping on the line, commonly called Eve. In parallel to the “full quantum proofs”
mentioned above, the security of real QKD systems has been put on a stable information-theoretic
footing thanks to the work on secret key agreement done in the framework of information-theoretic
cryptography [66] and to its extensions, triggered by the new possibilities offered by the advances
in quantum information science [67] and [69].
3on the other hand, provable computational security exists for classical asymmetric schemes.
4the difference is indeed of several orders of magnitude, see [17] for references and details.
5the perfect secrecy of the key has to be considered from an information-theoretic point of view: the information the
eavesdropper may have about the key is, with an exponentially high probability, below a vanishingly small upper bound.
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QKD Device QKD Device
Quantum Channel
Classical Channel
Alice Bob
Eve
QKD Link
Figure 1: Structure of a QKD link as it is referred throughout this article
Without going into the details of the different implementations or protocols (one can consult
Refs [3, 4, 5] for an extensive overview on that point) we can describe the structure and the principle
of operation of the basic practical QKD system: a QKD link. As depicted on Fig. 1, a QKD link is a
point-to-point connection between two users, commonly called Alice and Bob, that want to share
secret keys. The QKD link is constituted by the combination of a quantum channel and a classical
channel6. Alice generates a random stream of classical bits and encodes them into a sequence of
non-orthogonal quantum states of light, sent over the quantum channel. Upon reception of those
quantum states, Bob performs some appropriatemeasurements leading him to share some classical
data correlated with Alice’s bit stream. The classical channel is then used to test these correlations.
If the correlations are high enough, this statistically implies that no significant eavesdropping has
taken place on the quantum channel and thus that with very high probability, a perfectly secure
symmetric key can be distilled from the correlated data shared by Alice and Bob. In the opposite
case, the key generation process has to be aborted and started again.
QKD is a symmetric Secret Key Agreement technique that requires, as initial resources, a public
quantum channel and an authenticated public classical channel. As discussed in [2, 119] and also in
sections 3 and 4 , there are differentways to obtain an authenticated public channel. If one wants to
stay in the paradigm of information-theoretic security even for the authentication, then Alice and
Bob need to share, in advance, a short secret key (whose length scales only logarithmically in the
length of the secret key generated by a QKD session [24, 25, 26, 27]). Hence, QKD, operated in this
regime, is a symmetric unconditionally secure Secret Key Expansion scheme. In contrast to what
is achievable while relying solely on the exchange of classical messages, the key expansion factor
provided by QKD is exponential, hence, after initialization of the system (initial distribution of
small secret authentication keys), authentication is not a burden for the global performance (secret
bit rate per second) of QKD schemes. It is also very important to note that QKD would remain
secure (unconditionally) even in the advent of a quantum computer. In addition, legitimate users
(Alice and Bob) can perform unconditionally secure QKD even without possessing themselves
a quantum computer, and QKD can thus be deployed today in order to secure communication
networks. Studying how such QKD networks can be built and operated has been the main focus
of the SECOQC project and we will develop on this aspect in Section 4.
2.5. Trusted Couriers Key Distribution (TCKD)
The trusted courier method is known since the ancient times: a trusted courier travels between
the different legitimate users to distribute the secret keys, hopefully without being intercepted or
corrupted on his way by any potential opponent. Only practical security can be invoked in this
case, which has to be backed by the enforcement of an appropriate set of security measures. Al-
though trusted couriers become costly and unpractical when implemented on large systems, this
technique has remained in use in some highly-sensitive environments such as government intelli-
6Note that a quantum channel can always been used as a classical channel, when restricted to convey orthogonal quan-
tum states, so without loss of generality, only a quantum channel is “materially speaking” needed
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gence, or defense. The trusted courier method is also used by banks to solve the very common, but
highly strategic problem of distributing their credit card PIN numbers to the bank customers7.
The Trusted Couriers Key Distribution (TCKD) is probably one of the methods used in the
framework of network security for which the analogy with QKD is the closest:
• Like QKD, TCKD is a method relying on the physical security of the communication line
between Alice and Bob, it is thus also sensitive to distance and other characteristics (danger,
perturbations ...) of the communication line between Alice and Bob.
• Like QKD, TCKD can be used as a Secret Key Agreement protocol.
• Like QKD, TCKD needs some initial trust in the relative identities of Alice and Bob. More-
over, like for QKD, this necessary initial trusted authentication can be handled via different
techniques, such as the pre-distribution of a secret key (such as a password), or the use of an
unforgeable (or at least reputed to be such) public identity certificate issued by a trusted third
party (such as as the seal that was used by emperors and kings or the signed certificates we
now use for public keys).
• Like QKD, TCKD is a technique that currently finds its application when classical Secret Key
Agreement schemes are believed not to offer enough security guarantees.
Despite the similarities listed above, there are important differences between QKD and TCKD:
• The first difference is really intrinsic to QKD and TCKD “physical realities”. In the case of
QKD, the “couriers” are quantum states of lights (flying qubits) traveling at the speed of light
and on which eavesdropping can be detected with arbitrary high statistical certainty. On the
other hand, TCKD cannot offer any of those guarantees and, whether one uses human beings
or pigeons, trust or corruption of a classical courier cannot be proven nor tested.
• Reliability, automation and cost effectiveness will, very likely, be one of the major advances
offered by the development of QKD networks, that can moreover efficiently handle key man-
agement issues. On the other hand, reliability and cost of TCKD infrastructures are critical
problems and there is no real hope that such systems can ever be automated, leading to seri-
ous key management issues and very high operational costs.
• Unlike point-to-point QKD links, classical trusted couriers are not intrinsically limited in dis-
tance. They are also not very limited in rate since they can take advantage of the possibilities
offered by today’s portable and versatile classical memories, such as DVDs or USB keys, that
can store Gigabytes of data. We will however see in section 4 that QKD networks could be
used to go beyond QKD links distance limitations and that such networks could also be used
to distribute secret keys “on demand” to the end users, which is fundamentally different from
relying on keys stored on the very same DVD, that could be duplicated at any later point in
time if some adversary manages to break the protections around the storage device.
2.6. Cascaded schemes and Dual Key agreement
Cascaded ciphers. For all the cryptographic methods described in the previous subsections, and
for which we have been discussing the applicability to solve the Secret Key Agreement problem,
there exists an encryption scheme that relies on the same principles and exhibits the same secu-
rity properties: One-Time Pad for information-theoretically secure schemes, Public-key ciphers
and symmetric-key ciphers respectively for asymmetric and for symmetric computationally-secure
schemes.
The idea of Cascaded Cipher is to compose several encryption primitives by applying them se-
quentially on the same cleartext. Note that the encryption primitives can be of different types as
in AES-Twofish or the same one as in 3DES. The interest of cascading ciphers is to increase the
amount of difficulty an adversary has to overcome in order to break the encryption and find the
message. As pointed out byMaurer andMassey, [68], the first encryption layer, i.e. the one directly
applied to the message, is in all cases the most important one.
7The solution adopted today by the banks is to send the cards and the PIN numbers in different envelopes to minimize
the possibility that someone could steal both.
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Dual Secret Key Agreement. This idea of CascadedCipher can straightforwardly be applied to Secret
Key Agreement: two keys of the same length are established through two Secret Key Agreement
schemes (relying on either the same primitive or on different ones) and the final key is obtained by
XORing these two keys. We will talk, in this context, of Dual Secret Key Agreement. Note that more
than two Secret Key Agreement schemes, of various types, can in principle be combined this way.
We will restrict, in the following to a discussion of Dual Secret Key Agreement involving QKD as
one of the Secret Key Agreement technique.
The approach of Dual Secret Key Agreement could for example be beneficial when combining
keys established through one CITSKA scheme and keys established through QKD: breaking the
entire Secret Key Agreement scheme implies breaking the CITSKA scheme and breaking QKD. If
one has doubts about the security of QKD, the Dual Secret Key Agreement procedure guarantees
that the security will at least not be worse than that of the classical Secret Key Agreement technique
with which it is combined. The same is true if one has doubts about the security of Secret Key
Agreement scheme based on classical cryptography. However, while there already exist security
standards in classical cryptography (for example FIPS 140 [72], or Common Criteria [73]), there are
not yet such standards for QKD. The approach of Dual Secret Key Agreement could thus allow to
certify a system according to already established criteria, without requiring to specify the quantum
part of the Key Establishment. However, as we shall see in subsection 6.2, the certification of
quantum crypto-systems is a topic on which work is already being initiated [70, 71] and we can
hope to have FIPS-140 or Common Criteria certified QKD systems within a few years.
3. Securing a point-to-point classical communication link by combining QKD with symmetric
encryption
QKD is a Secret Key Agreement primitive that can be realized solely at the physical layer level.
In the previous section, we have compared QKD to the other existing solutions for Secret Key
Agreement. We will now analyze how the secret keys established by QKD can be used to perform
a link layer cryptographic task: securing the data sent on a classical communication link, by relying
solely on the keys generated by QKD (plus some initially shared small secret authentication keys)
and on symmetric-key cryptographic primitives.
More formally, we consider here the problem of securely transmitting classical messages (pay-
load) from Alice to Bob via the following generic protocol:
1. Establishment of a symmetric secret key KS = Kencrypt ·Kauth between Alice and Bob (X · Y
stands for the concatenation of string X with string Y ).
2. Secure and authentic transmission of themessageM over the classical channel, with symmetric-
key cryptographic primitives: M is encrypted with encryption key Kencrypt and authenticated
with the authentication key Kauth.
After a brief subsection about the performances of QKD devices we will analyze several decli-
nations of the generic scenario described above, in which QKD is used as the Secret Key Agreement
primitive over a point-to-point link, while different types of encryption and authentication schemes
are used.
3.1. Performance of QKD link devices: recent progresses
QKD systems are being developed with an increasing reliability and with increasing perfor-
mances, and the SECOQC project [6], gathering many of the most prominent experimental and
theoretical European teams involved in QKD research, has actively contributing to the pursuit of
this progression that is indeed carried out also on an international level [45, 47, 44, 51, 48, 50, 49,
52, 54, 59, 53, 55]. One can currently expect to exchange up to 1 Mbits of secret key per second,
over a point-to-point QKD link of 20 km [51]. The maximum span of QKD links is now roughly
around 100 km or even 140 km [51, 48] (depending on the type of single photon detector that is
used) at 1550 nm on a telecom dark fiber8. Both secret bit rate and maximum reachable distance
8somehow surprisingly, a comparable maximum span has also been reached in the context of ground-to-ground free
space QKD [44]. This experiment was successfully realized with a quantum channel whose losses were one order of mag-
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are expected to continue their progression during the next years due to combined theoretical and
experimental advances. Note that in any case QKD performances are intrinsically upper bounded
by the performance of classical optical communications9. It is important to notice that QKD sys-
tems can now basically be built with optimized, off-the-shelves telecom components (laser, phase
modulators, beamsplitters, polarisation controllers, and etc.) at the notable exception of photode-
tectors. Photodetection is currently the bottleneck for the performance of QKD systems, but it is
important to keep in mind that, even on that side, although there are many technical problems to
overcome, there are very few fundamental limitations for rate and distance, as detection methods
are making significant progresses [57, 58, 59, 51, 48, 55]. Another approach, known as “Continuous
Variables QKD” (CVQKD), and also implemented in SECOQC, uses only standard PIN photo-
diodes, but requires more sophisticated data processing in order to extract the secret keys [56].
Within the duration of the SECOQC project, significant progresses, on the theoretical [60] as well
on the implementation side [50] have been achieved for CVQKD. Moreover, further advances on
the protocol side may allow CVQKD systems, that were known to be able to deliver high bit-rate
but only for small or medium losses on the quantum channel, to become suitable for long-distance,
high-bit rate QKD [49].
3.2. QKD composed with One-Time-Pad: Everlasting Secrecy
When keys established by QKD are used for One-Time Pad encryption and for information-
theoretically secure authentication, then one can obtain unconditional security over the resulting
point-to-point classical communication link.
This result can be formally proven thanks to the fact that the security of QKD can be expressed
in the framework of Universal Composability [28]: unconditionally secure Secret Key Agreement,
realized by QKD, cannot be distinguished from an ideal Secret Key Agreement protocol interacting
with some environment. This implies that QKD can be composed with any other universally com-
posable unconditionally secure cryptographic primitive, while still guaranteeing the unconditional
security of the whole cryptographic scheme [69].
Concerning authentication, information-theoretically secure symmetric-key authentication prim-
itives are based on universal hashing. Such authentication codes were first introduced by Wegman
and Carter and further developed, especially by Stinson [24, 25, 26]. If One-Time Pad encryption
and information-theoretically secure authentication scheme are used, one can show that both prim-
itives are composable and thus that an unconditionally secure message transmission protocol can
be built out of them [29].
Allowing to build an unconditionally secure classical communication link is one of the most
important domains for the application of QKD to secure communications and to secure networks.
This is the cryptographic framework in which the SECOQC project has chosen to work, as de-
scribed in subsection 5.
Since they benefit from the perfect secrecy offered by One-Time Pad and from the fact that the
keys established by QKD are unconditionally secure, the messages exchanged over such uncondi-
tionally secure links enjoy one security property that can be called “everlasting secrecy”: the mes-
sages are perfectly secretwith respect to adversaries and there is provably absolutely no chance that
future events could alter the secrecy of these messages. “Everlasting security” (which is achieved
even if the authentication scheme is only computationally secure) is one of the big advantages of
quantum cryptography compared to computational cryptography.
As pointed out in [119], long-term security is needed in many specific application scenarios,
such as the protection of medical records, industrial secrets and military or governmental classi-
fied informations. However, offering long-term security for highly sensitive data is not something
that can be guaranteed by today’s computationally secure schemes. Indeed, as written in [14],
“beyond approximately 10 years into the future, the general feeling among ECRYPT partners is
that recommendations made today should be assigned a rather small confidence level, perhaps in
nitude larger than what we expect them to be in the framework of space-to-ground communications. It thus has paved the
way towards QKD between a satellite and a ground station [54]
9and it will always lag behind in terms of rate and distance. However, since current optical networks are now reaching
capacity in the Petabit/s range, there definitively remains some room - and thus reasons to hope - for improvements.
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particular for asymmetric primitives”. As a matter of fact, it is important to note that when one
deals with the transmission of encrypted information, an adversary can always store the ciphertext
andwait for the decryption until better cryptanalysis methods become available (for examplemore
efficient algorithms for factoring or the discovery of an efficient way to attack AES) or better crypt-
analysis hardware (indeed large quantum computers would be very efficient for breaking most of
the asymmetric encryption primitives in use today). The recommendation of ECRYPT is indeed to
consider using One-Time-Pad encryption for high-security levels, “provided the key management
can be solved” [14]. In this perspective, the combination of QKD with One-Time-Pad, which pro-
vides a practical solution for unconditionnally-secure data transmission over a point-to-point link
(solution that can indeed be extended in the context of networks, see section 4) seems to be a natu-
ral response to meet some of the most stringent requirements within high-security communication
infrastructures: long-term security.
3.3. QKD composed with a classical computationally secure symmetric encryption scheme: Key security
and Key Ageing
Here we will consider one very frequent use case: QKD is used for Secret Key Agreement
between two users placed on each side of a point to point QKD link. Link encryption is then
realised with a computationally secure symmetric encryption scheme (such as AES) in order to be
able to encrypt large rates of classical data over the link layer. This solution is indeed the one that is
currently adopted by all the commercial QKD vendors: IdQuantique, MagiQ and SmartQuantum
[7] and it was also the solution adopted within the BBN Darpa Quantum Network project [80].
Such a composition provides a practical solution to realise a point-to-point VPN encryptor, that
can be deployed in layer 2 (link) in the OSI network layer model [7] or directly in the layer 3
(network), for example by interfacing QKD-based key exchange with IPSEC [81, 82]
It is clear that the final security of the exchanged data over such link cannot be stronger than
the security of the encryption scheme. In the case of a symmetric-key block cipher, the security of
the encrypted data depends on at least four factors:
1. the security of the key (can an opponent get even some partial information about the key ?);
2. the number of blocks that have been encrypted with the same key (key renewal rate);
3. the length of the key modulus (56 bits for DES, 128, 192 or 256 bits for AES);
4. the security of the symmetric-key encryption algorithm, for which only “practical computa-
tional security” can be claimed.
The last two factors are purely dependent on the encryption technique and not at all on the Key
Agreement scheme. The security implications (and the security level) associated with the choice of
a given symmetric cipher, with a given key modulus length is discussed in detail in [16, 13, 14]. In
the ECRYPT Yearly Report on Algorithms and Keysizes published in july 2008 [14], a symmetric
key modulus of 128 bits is recommended for long-term security (while 256 bits is recommended
for a good protection of symmetric ciphers against a quantum computer).
The first two factors, on the other hand, are influenced by the choice of the Secret Key Agree-
ment scheme: the security of the key is intrinsically linked to the security of the Secret Key Agree-
ment scheme while the key renewal rate also strongly depends, on a practical level (hardware
performance, security policy, implementation details, etc.), on the Key Establishment scheme. We
will discuss in the following whether QKD-based schemes, used in replacement of traditional Key
Agreement schemes, present an interest with respect to these two factors, and thus where QKD-
based key renewal can lead to an improvement of the overall security of a computationally-secure,
symmetric-key, encrypted communication link.
3.3.1. Security of the key
As explained in section 2, the Secret Key Agreement scheme can be of different types, but QKD
is the only existing and practically implementable scheme that can offer information-theoretic se-
curity and thus guarantee that the information that an opponent can get about the key is below a
vanishingly small upper bound. All the other alternative Secret Key Agreement schemes, based
on computationally secure symmetric-key or public-key primitives, cannot offer the same security
guarantee regarding the security of the keys that will be used for encryption and authentication.
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Of course, as previously discussed, QKD has to rely on some initial trusted material in order
to allow the initial authentication of the classical communications that is needed to perform Secret
Key Expansion with unconditional security (see subsection 2.3 for more details). The security of
the keys will inherently be derived from this trust that can consist in previously shared small secret
keys (distributed by an initial “rendez-vous” between Alice and Bob, or by a Trusted Courier) or
in a trusted third party and the use of public-key cryptography. In this section, we consider a
link layer scenario, based on symmetric-key cryptography and thus assume that authentication
is guaranteed by the pre-distribution of a small symmetric key between Alice and Bob. We will
discuss in the next section, how the constraints attached to this requirement can be mitigated in
a network context and indeed even married with public-key cryptography. A recent article [119]
also discusses the issue of authentication and QKDwith great clarity, answering some of the claims
expressed earlier in [8]. The book of Gilles Van Assche [2] also contains an extremely valuable
discussion about the question of authentication in QKD.
3.3.2. Key renewal rate
When one considers the global security level one can obtain on a communication link, there is
also a second factor that can as well indirectly depend on the Secret Key Agreement scheme : the
key renewal rate.
As we shall see, the key renewal rate can indeed influence the security of the encrypted data.
This is what we call the Key Ageing factor, that can be reformulated as a question: how often secret
session keys should be changed and what is the impact on the global security of the classical mes-
sage passing scheme ? To give elements of answer to this question, we will consider the practical
example that corresponds to what current QKD vendors are selling: combining QKD-based Secret
Key Agreement with AES, in order to make a link encryptor.
• A practical example: key renewal for AES encryption
Let’s first take the example of fast DES Xilinx encryption systems that are currently commercialised
[30]. Data is encrypted at a rate of 1.5 Gbit/s, the number of packets (of 64 bits) encrypted per sec-
ond (with a 56-bit key) is 107.373 ≃ 224.5 blocks/s. There exist known cryptographic problems with
some block ciphers (including AES operated in Cipher Block Chaining mode or in Accumulated
Block Chaining mode or DES) such as known plaintext attacks based on the birthday paradox,
when the number of blocks encrypted with the same key reaches 2blocklength/2 [16] 10. In the case of
DES 56-bit keys, this would occur after 27.5 ≃ 3 minutes.
Let’s now take the case of 128-bit AES for which Xilinx produces dedicated cipher modules that can
support a data rate of 2.2 Gbit/s [30] and for which “dedicated research hardware” has recently
demonstrated a rate of 21.54 Gbit/s [31]. In this case, the number of blocks (of 128 bits) encrypted
per second (with a 128-bit key) is 108.23 ≃ 227 blocks/s. “Birthday paradox” collisions become very
likely after 264 blocks (of 128 bits) have been encrypted with the same key. This occurs in a time of
about 237 seconds, i.e. roughly 4000 years ,which means in practice that this is not a problem.
We must however not forget that the previous calculation is done under the assumption that
exhaustive search is the best attack on AES. It seems thus important to question this assumption
and study what can be said about the influence of the encryption key renewal rate on the security
of AES. As we shall see in the next paragraph, this complex question is indeed intrinsically linked
to the security assumptions one can make on AES itself.
• Security of AES: confronting the different assumptions to what we currently know
The cryptanalysis of encryption schemes like AES is a difficult topic that is still subject to very
active research and it seems realistic to think that the ultimate difficulty of such cryptanalysis is
currently not known.
The actual status is however that there exist no known breaks of AES. More precisely, if one
considers the problem of finding the secret key used in AES, and has access to a large number N
10This is because one only require 2blocklength/2 ciphertext to obtain a matching pair of ciphertexts with probability
> 1/2.
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of couples of blocks of known cleartext / ciphertext, there is no published attacks known to be
more efficient than attacks based on exhaustive search on the key space (for AES, such exhaustive
search starts to have a non-negligible chance of success only if the number of trials is comparable
or greater than 264.
For block ciphers, the practical security depends in particular on the number of rounds applied
when encrypting one block (see [16] for details). Even though AES is thus believed to be secure
(and is currently a standard whose use is recommended even for institutions dealing with high-
security: for example AES128 is considered sufficient up to the SECRET level, while AES192 or
AES256 is required for TOP SECRET [79]) it is already known that weaker versions of AES, with
reduced numbers of rounds, can be attacked successfully by strategies that require less computa-
tional efforts than exhaustive search. As explained in the security report of the IST FP5 program
NESSIE (NESSIE Deliverable D20) [16], there exist cryptanalysis techniques that start to obtain bet-
ter results than exhaustive search, on AES with a reduced number of rounds, as soon as 232 blocks
have been encrypted with the same key.
Some cryptographers also claim that powerful algebraic attacks could break AES based only on
a very small number of known cleartext / ciphertext [32]. However, algebraic attacks have never
been successfully demonstrated on AES and are not regarded as a real threat by the majority of the
classical cryptography community. We indeed quote the ECRYPT 2008 report [14] on the question
of algebraic attacks: “While issues remain somewhat opaque, the AES cannot currently be consid-
ered vulnerable to such analysis”.
Finally, as also noted in [14], security aspects of implementation(s) of the AES are probably the
most pressing issues. Indeed as first established thanks to the pioneering work of P. Kocher at the
end of the 1990’s [77, 78], one can exploit physical properties of crypto-systems (and in particular
the so-called “physical side-channels”, through which information about secret keys is leaking
while cryptographic computations are being conducted) to mount extremely powerful on those
crypto-systems. The first efficient attacks to be studied were passive attacks based on monitoring
the execution time and then the power consumption of classical cryptographic devices (whose
implementations ultimately rely on the use semiconductor logic gates and thus of transistors) [77,
78]. The variety of side-channel attacks and of counter-measures has gradually expanded since
then and one can for example consult the Side Channel Cryptanalysis Lounge ECRYPT for a good
overview of what is already known[76].
Such attacks are of course only possible as long as the opponent can observe the signals asso-
ciated with the side-channels, it thus implies that the opponent has a certain degree of physical
access to the crypto-systems he wants to attack. This last remark is of particular interest when we
consider the combination of QKDwith AES to perform link encryption: since current QKD devices
need to be installed in trusted environments, on both end of the quantum and classical channels
(that are allowed to be fully untrusted), then it is logical to assume that the AES encryptors are
also placed inside the same trusted environments and thus protected against side-channel crypt-
analysis. However, in the general case (and especially considering the large variety of application
scenarios that can be imagined, based on a QKD network such as the one demonstrated at the
end of the SECOQC project, cf. 4), the environment in which Secret Key Agreement is performed
does not need to be the environment in which the AES encryption can take place (indeed, AES
encryption on a smartphone connected to the SECOQC QKD network has been demonstrated as
one potential use case of QKD networks [70]).
• Combining QKD with AES encryption: what can we say about the influence of the key re-
newal rate ?
If AES is considered perfectly sure, then the limit of 2blocklength/2 blocks after which the keys
have to be renewed in order to avoid collision-related problems is in practice not a problem, and
one cannot justify the need to renew the AES keys as often as a QKD can allow to do it 11.
However, as we have seen in the previous paragraphs, there exist arguments, based on some
known algorithmic cryptographic weaknesses of reduced versions of AES, that indicate that it
11with 13 kbit/s of secret bit rate, one could renew more than 100 AES128 secret keys per second
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could be beneficial for the global security of AES encryption to refresh the secret keys after a num-
ber of blocks that is significantly smaller than 2blocklength/2, which could indeed lead to a need to
renew keys with a periodicity of the order of a few minutes.
Indeed, if we consider in addition the existing vulnerabilities of AES implementation to side-
channel attacks, then the requirements on key renewal rate become even more stringent: state-
of-the-art DPA attacks (Differential Power Analysis attacks, that do not disrupt at all the encryp-
tion process) can successfully break unprotected AES implementations after the acquisition of 100
power traces, while roughly 50000 power traces are needed to break protected implementations of
AES. Even dedicated and protected hardware implementations of AES can thus be broken in a few
minutes with DPA (see [75] for details). Moreover, if one allows attacks based on fault injection in
the circuit, then a full break of AES128 has been obtained in a few seconds, with only 2 pairs of
correct and faulty ciphertext [74]. This result indicates that, in the context of embedded systems
where trust in the environment cannot be guaranteed, very fast key renewal can become a necessity
when one wants to guarantee the security of AES and thus of the entire scheme12.
4. Key Distribution over a Network of QKD links : QKD Networks
There are several fundamental limits regarding what can be achieved with standalone QKD
links. QKD links can by definition only operate over point-to-point connections between two users,
which greatly restricts the domain of applicability of quantum key distribution within secure com-
munication networks. Furthermore, since they rely on the transmission of quantum information in
order to guarantee security against on-line eavesdropping, QKD links are limited in rate and dis-
tance, and cannot be deployed over any arbitrary network topology. To overcome those limitations,
it seems important to study what can be achieved by networking QKD links in order to extend the
extremely high security standard offered by QKD to the context of long distance communications
between multiple users. The development of QKD network architectures appears from this per-
spective as a necessary step towards the effective integration of QKD into secure data networks.
This is the main focus of the SECOQC project [6], that has culminated by the demonstration of
information-theoretically secure key distribution over a fiber-based telecom metropolitan area net-
work in Vienna, Austria, in october 2008 [116].
We will begin this section by an overview on the different generic QKD network architectures
that have already been proposed. We will then present some elements of comparison between
QKD networks and classical network, for the purpose of network-wide Key Distribution.
4.1. QKD network architectures
What we call a “quantum network” is an infrastructure composed of quantum links connecting
multiple distant nodes. A quantum network can be used for Key Distribution, relying for that on
QKD. We call such infrastructures “QKD networks”.
The essential functionality of the QKD network is to distribute unconditionally secure sym-
metric secret keys to any pair of legitimate users accessing the network. These first elements of
definition are however fairly generic and can be refined. Indeed, even though we are at the in-
fancy of the development of QKD networks, different models of QKD networks have already been
proposed.
It is convenient to characterise the different QKD network models by the functionality that is
implemented within the nodes and thus by the different underlying quantum network models.
We can, from this perspective, differentiate three main categories of network concepts, based on
different “families” of node functionalities : 1) optical switching ; 2) quantum relaying ; and 3)
classical trusted relaying.
12This necessity is likely to be justified operationally when one wants to guarantee a relatively high security level even
on embedded systems, however there are alternative ways (already actively explored) to tackle this issues, such as the
development of algorithmic and hardware counter-measures to make systems more to side-channels attacks [76]. Our
point is that QKD-based key renewal could also be an option worth considering, in combination with the other efforts
already in order to strengthen the security of systems that use AES encryption in non-trusted environments
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Optically switched quantum networks:. These are networks in which some classical optical function,
like beam splitting, switching, multiplexing, demultiplexing, etc., can be applied at the network
nodes on the quantum signals sent over the quantum channel. The interest of such optical network-
ing capabilities in the context of QKD networks is that they allow to go beyond two-users QKD.
One-to-many connectivity between QKD devices was demonstrated over a passively switched op-
tical network, using the random splitting of single photons upon beam splitters [83]. Active optical
switching can also be used to allow the selective connection of any two QKD nodes with a direct
quantum channel. The BBN Darpa quantum network [80, 81] contains an active 2-by-2 optical
switch in one node, that can be used to actively switch between two network topologies. Optical
functions can thus be used to realise multi-user QKD and the corresponding nodes do not need
to be trusted, since quantum signals are transmitted over a quantum channel with no interruption
from one end-user QKD device to the other one. This QKD network model can however not be
used to extend the distance over which keys can be distributed. Indeed, the extra amount of optical
losses introduced in the nodes will in reality shorten the maximum span of quantum channels.
“Full” quantum networks:. To be able to extend the distance on which quantum key distribution
can be performed, it is necessary to fight against propagation losses that affect the “quality” of the
quantum signals as they travel over the quantum channel. Quantum repeaters[85] can overcome
the loss problem and can be used to form an effective perfect quantum channel [84]. A quantum
network where nodes are constituted by quantum repeaters can thus be called a “full” quantum
network. It is not necessary to trust the network nodes to have unconditional security when per-
forming QKD over such full quantum networks.
Quantum repeaters however rely on elaborated quantum operations and on quantum memo-
ries that cannot be realised with current technologies. As discussed in [86], quantum nodes called
quantum relays could also be used to extend the reach of QKD. Quantum relays are simpler to
implement than quantum repeaters since they don’t require quantum memories. Building quan-
tum relays remains however technologically difficult and would not allow to extend QKD reach to
arbitrary long distances.
Trusted repeater QKD network:. This technique can on the other hand be implemented with today’s
technologies since such nodes consist in classical memories placedwithin the nodes, that thus need
to be trusted. QKD networks based on trusted key repeater nodes follow a simple principle: local
keys are generated over QKD links and then stored in nodes that are placed on both ends of each
link. Global key distribution is performed over a QKD path, i.e. a one-dimensional chain of trusted
repeaters connected by QKD links, establishing a connection between two end nodes, as shown on
Fig. 2. Secret keys are forwarded, in a hop-by-hop fashion, along QKD paths. To ensure their
secrecy, One-Time Pad encryption and unconditionally secure authentication, both realised with
a local QKD key, are performed. The link primitive of such a network is indeed precisely the one
discussed in 3.2, and the message sent is a random session key by one of the end-users (the sender).
End-to-end information-theoretic security is thus obtained between the end nodes, provided that
the intermediate nodes can be trusted. Classical trusted repeaters can be used to build a long-
distance QKD network. The advantage of such quantum networks is that they rely on QKD for
link Key Establishment, which renders impossible to compromise the Key Establishment by direct
attacks on the links13.
4.2. Classical Network Key Distribution Schemes and QKD Networks: Elements of comparison
4.2.1. Key Establishment Rate
As we have seen in 3.3.2, some security requirements related to current block ciphers such as
AES couldmotivate the need to refresh secret keys of such ciphers over times shorter than aminute.
Although this is possible in practice with current technology, relying on Diffie-Hellman and PKIs,
such key renewal rate policies are very seldom (if not never) enforced and the key renewal period
13except for side-channel attacks on the QKD links (those attacks being only possible on “bad QKD implementations”)
and for denial-of-service attacks.
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Node1 Node2 Node3 Node4 Node5
Figure 2: “Hop-by-hop” unconditionally secure message passing on a path made of trusted relay nodes connected by QKD
links. Message decryption / re-encryption is done at each intermediate node, by using one-time-pad between the local
key, distributed by QKD, Klocal, and the secret message M resulting in the ciphered message M
L
Klocal. Different key
associations are symbolised by different colours.
of most currently deployed VPNs is more in the range of hours. As a matter of fact, since public-
key cryptography is rather slow and computational intensive and is using long key modulus (see
details in 2.2), it could become an extremely high burden for end-users in terms of time and CPU
consumption 14 if key renewal was to be done over times shorter than one minute.
On the other hand, despite the fact that QKD is very often portrayed as slow [8], QKD rates,
as we have mentioned earlier, are currently reaching several hundreds kbit/s for metropolitan
distances. This implies that QKD networks could typically allow to refresh thousands of 128-bits
AES keys per second, over VPN links in a metropolitan network. This means that QKD networks,
when used as a security enabler of other network applications, could compare rather favourably, at
least from a pure “Key Establishment rate point of view” with respect to asymmetric cryptography
and PKIs.
4.2.2. Network Initialization and Key Pre-distribution
Secure networks always rely on some initial trust in order to be able to provide some security
guarantee. As discussed in 2.4, a pair of initial small secrets or an authenticated classical channel is
necessary to initialize a QKD link. We now consider the question of network initialization and key
pre-distribution for symmetric-key-based and asymmetric-key-based secure networks and com-
pare it with the requirements of QKD networks. Indeed, as noted in [119], we also argue that the
combination of asymmetric-key (for key pre-distribution) and QKD presents some specific inter-
ests.
Key Pre-distribution over networks relying on symmetric-key cryptography. One of the central issues in
network Key Distribution is the initialisation and the management of a potentially very large pool
of secret keys: in a symmetric-key framework, where each member of a n-user network wants to
be able to communicate securely with each of the other n − 1 users, the Key Distribution scheme
is required to provide any of the n(n− 1)/2 pairs of users with a secret key before communication
can start. Managing the security of those keys efficiently is thus very difficult task as n grows. This
is probably the reason why large-scale symmetric-key cryptography is seldom used in today’s net-
works (however some network security schemes, like the Kerberos network authentication scheme
[92] rely on classical symmetric-key cryptography and on a single trusted center).
Key Pre-Distribution over QKD networks:. As pointed out in [8], QKD networks need pre-distributed
secret keys to perform the first rounds of authentication. The QKD-generated keys can then be
stored and used for later authentication. Initialization of a QKD network of n nodes thus a priori
requires the pre-distribution of n(n − 1)/2 pairs of secret keys (one per pair of user). However,
one can play with the QKD network connectivity and with the fact that keys can transitively be
distributed between any two nodes along a connected QKD path, relying for that on hop-by-hop
one-time-padding with local QKD keys. It is then easy to show that it is sufficient to distribute
keys over a subset of those n(n − 1)/2 pairs: what is needed is to distribute a pair of keys over
QKD links so that the resulting graph of “initialized” QKD links is a covering graph of the QKD
network. In this case, the complexity of Key Pre-distribution, that can typically only be done with
trusted couriers, only scales linearly with the network size.
14end-users support all the computational efforts linked to asymmetric cryptography in an open network
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PKI Initialization. PKI is the most commonly employed system for Key Distribution over open net-
works. PKI trust relations are materialized by certificates, i.e. signatures of public-keys and these
trust relations can be organized hierarchically, which offers the advantage that one does not need
to trust everybody in the network, but only to trust a third party which is called the certification
authority. Moreover, Diffie-Hellman scheme allows to perform a key exchange between two users
that have never met before and do not share any common secret: the only condition is that they
accept to trust the same certification authority (and accept its certificates). PKIs however also need
to be initialized, and the only way to perform such an initialization is indeed the use of another PKI
(of higher hierarchy) or the use of secret couriers. In this sense, the initialization of a QKD network
and the initialization of a PKI are two problems that share some similarities.
Interest of PKIs for QKDNetwork Initialization. As pointed out in [8], QKD networks however present
a security advantage over PKIs when we consider the initialization phase: in order to threaten the
security of a QKD network, the authentication of the messages sent over the classical channel of
this network needs to be broken before or during the execution of the quantum key establishment
protocol. In this sense, the authentication in QKD network exhibits a property called “forward
security”, which is of course not the case in public-key based secure networks. We could take ad-
vantage of this property in the case of QKD network initialisation and consider an hybrid scenario
for Key Pre-distribution, in which the classical communications needed for the key distillation
phase are authenticated, at least during the first QKD sessions, by a computationally secure mes-
sage authentication scheme based on public-key cryptography (for which the PKI has been freshly
initialized). If no active attack on authentication has been performed before the first -potentially
vulnerable15- QKD sessions, then the keys shared by Alice and Bob are identical and uncondition-
ally secure. Note that the previous condition will always be verified if the computational power
of the adversary is bounded at the time of the QKD network initialization, with no restriction on
how the adversary’s capabilities may evolve in the future. Such keys could therefore be used to
realize information-theoretically secure authentication of all future classical messages exchanged
during the future key distillation phases. Hence, the flow of keys generated by QKD will remain
future-proof unless an active attack on the authentication of the first QKD sessions can be mounted
successfully.
There is a clear practical interest for such a scheme: it relaxes the requirement of distributing
pre-established small keys in a QKD network for each network initialization (which requires secret
couriers and can be a difficult key management problem in the case of large networks).
4.3. Open networks versus trusted QKD networks
As pointed out in [94], “quantum cryptology is not a solution for open networks”, i.e. a QKD
network does not allow users that do not share any pre-established secret or trust relation to ex-
change a key and then communicate securely. In a sense QKD networks are tied by their “physical
nature”: they can only operate under trust conditions, are limited in distance because some phys-
ical, uncloneable quantum states are being exchanged over quantum channels and some physi-
cal interaction (trusted courier) is needed to initialize such networks. QKD networks, now at an
early development stage, are intrinsically “physically-limited” networks. These physical limita-
tions however bring a considerable security advantage: QKD networks can provide unconditional
security to all the users that have access rights to the network and are thus inside the “circle of trust”
of these closed networks. Indeed, as we shall discuss in 6.3, the practicality of asymmetric cryptog-
raphy and its suitability for open networks may have as a counterpart the existence of stronger vul-
nerabilities to cryptanalysis (vulnerabilities that moreover are not restricted to quantum-computer-
based cryptanalysis). This situation implies that the use of asymmetric cryptography is somehow
more risky that the use of symmetric primitives when one wants to guarantee long-term security.
The difference between quantum networks and classical networks thus appears to be almost
philosophical : they do not offer the same services and exhibit a relation with space and distance
that is extremely different: while classical open networks, and especially the Internet have been
described as “small worlds”, where physical signals can be regenerated, data can be copied and
15the vulnerability we consider here would stem from weaknesses of asymmetric cryptography
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distances are almost abolished [95] , quantum networks are by essence closed networks where
distance comes back into the game. We believe that the topological design of the future quan-
tum networks is indeed a very fertile research problem, and have started investigating this aspect
within the SECOQC project [91, 112].
5. Demonstrated QKD Networks, with a focus on the SECOQC QKD network design
The first QKD network demonstrator, the “DARPA Quantum network”, has been deployed
between Harvard University, Boston University and BBN in 2004 [80, 81]. It relied on the concept
of trusted repeater QKD network described in 4.1, and also demonstrated optical switching on the
quantum channel to allow one to two connectivity.
The concept of truster repeater QKD network has also been used within the SECOQC QKD
network [87, 114, 116].The focus of the SECOQC project was to contribute to scientific and tech-
nical achievements leading to “long-range high security communications based on quantum key
distribution”. As explained above, combining this objective with the constraints of today’s tech-
nology imposes to rely on an architecture based on classical trusted repeater nodes. An important
choice however lies in the network protocols and logical architecture allowing to use the QKD link-
specific local keys in order to secure long-distance traffic. The SECOQC consortium has adopted
an original network architecture and a dedicated network management designed solely to address
the problem of key distribution over a network of trusted nodes linked by QKD links. One can
find details regarding this network architecture in [87] and in [114, 115, 116]. The main original-
ity of the SECOQC project, with respect to previous QKD networks, relies on the fact that it has
opted for a dedicated key distribution network infrastructure called “network of secrets” [90]. The func-
tionality of the network of secrets is solely to store, forward, and manage the secret key materials
generated by QKD. Such a key distribution network is characterised by dedicated link, network
and transport layer protocols and can be considered somehow independently from the quantum
key establishment processes and from the key requests that arise from applications running on
top of the network of secrets. This architectural design implies that the SECOQC QKD network,
contrary to previous works, clearly departs from a collection of QKD links: it implements dis-
tributed management and routing of the secret keys established on a link basis and can exploit the
full advantages offered by the network characteristics: increased reliability and flexibility achieved
through path redundancy, load balancing and traffic engineering of the network key exchanges
performed through dedicated routing algorithms and appropriate signalings. These functionality
have indeed been demonstrated, as describedd in [116]. The focus of SECOQC has moreover been
put on what has been called “Backbone QKD networks”, i.e., QKD networks exhibiting a high con-
nectivity and a meshed topology [89, 90]. As explained in [89, 91], a meshed topology ensures that
there exist multiple disjoint paths between any pair of QKD nodes, a property that can be exploited
to increase the security of final key distribution, by Dual Secret Key Agreement over disjoint pathes
[89, 113, 117, 116].
The central design issue behind the SECOQC QKD network concept is that the keys are stored
andmanagedwithin dedicated andwell-specified key stores, placed in nodes, and not within QKD
devices or within the machines running endpoint secure applications. This design choice will al-
low us to manage keys over a dedicated global network, the network of secrets, composed of key
stores linked together with classical channels. The network of secrets is by essence a classical net-
work, but, since it relies on QKD for local Secret Key Agreement and on unconditionally secure
cryptographic primitives to allow network-wide key distribution, it offers an unprecedented over-
all security even for long-distance communications. This last claim is of course only true if one
can guarantee that the nodes are indeed trusted nodes. Even though such assumptions might not
be unrealistic in today’s high security infrastructures (government secure networks, bank secure
networks, military headquarters and etc.) we have also shown that this assumption can be par-
tially relaxed to the case of Trusted Repeaters QKD networks where some nodes may be corrupted
[113, 117].
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6. Future directions
6.1. Resilience to side-channel attacks and historical security
Instead of trying to break the theoretical foundations of a given cryptographic system, another
“attack philosophy” is to attack the physical implementation, i.e. the devices on which the cryp-
tographic tasks are implemented. In fact, since a classical algorithm (for example of the RSA algo-
rithm) says a priori nothing about how computations should be physically carried out over some
physical devices, the theoretical security proof, even though it remains totally valid, does not pro-
vide any security guarantee against attacks made via physical side-channels such as electromag-
netic radiation, heat dissipation, noise, observation of computation time, of power consumption
and etc. Like for the attacks on the theoretical foundations of cryptographic systems, one distin-
guishes two types of side-channel attacks:
• Passive side-channel attacks, that are also well-known as “information leakage attacks”. Such
attacks do not require to actively manipulate the computation, but only to monitor the side-
channel leakage during the computation.
• Active side-channel attacks, in which we assume that the attacker actively manipulates the
execution of a cryptographic algorithm (trying for example to introduce faults in the compu-
tation).
Attacking the physical security of cryptographic systems has indeed proven to be an extremely suc-
cessful way of breaking the security offered by those systems. We indeed discussed in 3.3.2 the fact
that passive attacks have proven to be extremely efficient to break even protected implementation
of AES [75]. Indeed all classical cryptographic primitives (public-key-based and symmetric-key-
based) that we have considered in this document are vulnerable to side-channel attacks [16]. There
is an intrinsic reason for the vulnerability of classical crypto-systems to side-channel attacks: classi-
cal crypto-systems aremaking use of classical physical channels to convey some secret information.
Classical crypto-systems are thus exposed to a general vulnerability : it is not possible to guarantee
the absence of eavesdropping on such systems, relying on classical channels and classical data to
convey information, since classical data can be copied without introducing any perturbation.
There indeed seems to be an important potential advantage in a “quantum approach” of ma-
terial security and of side-channels problems: quantum physics is a theory that is intrinsically
adapted to precisely describe a physical system and its degrees of freedom: one can use the Hilbert
space formalism to describe a quantum system in a vectorial space whose dimension and struc-
ture can be, at least in theory, explicitly given, and for which a precise mathematical description
is possible. On the other hand, the security proofs for classical crypto-systems usually do not al-
low to model the physical implementations at all which makes the protection of current classical
crypto-systems against side channel attacks a very challenging problem [94].
Despite their conceptual differencewith classical crypto-systems, QKD hardware and quantum
crypto-systems are nevertheless in a large part made of classical macroscopic objects and are in-
deed also vulnerable to side-channel attacks. We however believe that the theoretical foundations
of quantum security proofs and the techniques developed to prove the security of QKD shed a
new light on the problem of side-channel in cryptography. The principle of QKD proofs indeed
relies on the ability to describe mathematically the conditions (based on the Hilbert space dimen-
sion) under which the quantum channel becomes immune to side channel attacks. As a matter
of fact, the “physical nature” of the quantum channel is embedded within the security proofs we
have for QKD. In one sense, only “bad implementations of QKD“ are vulnerable to side-channel
attacks on the quantum channel. What we designate, in this context, as “bad implementations”,
are implementations that do not comply to the protocol and the assumptions for which their se-
curity proof has been derived. QKD security proofs are indeed based on explicit assumptions on
the physical implementations, such as the mean number of photons per pulse sent on Alice’s side,
the detector noise, the attenuation of the quantum channel, etc. One crucial question is thus to
know whether realistic QKD systems comply with the existing security proofs. This question has
been widely tackled in the research literature on QKD: through the study of PNS attack [4], of its
counter-measure (Decoy-State QKD) [61, 62], of Trojan-horse attacks of various sorts [4], of QKD
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implementations based on imperfect devices [63], and etc. [5]; all these results are somehow re-
ducing the gap between the conditions under which security proof fully applies and the reality of
QKD implementations.
On the other hand, QKD security is always relying on an implicit assumption: Alice and Bob, who
are storing the final symmetric secret keys in classical memories must be located inside secure environments.
It is clear that if there exists a side-channel allowing to spy on the keys, once they are stored in a
classical memory, then the security of the keys is compromised. In amore general sense, since QKD
devices are for a large part made of classical objects, one crucial question will be relying on the way
to interface the classical and quantum part of QKD crypto-systems. Such interfaces are potentially
strategic choices for the opponents who want to eavesdrop on QKD crypto-systems side-channels,
and should be designed with great care. We believe that a quantum description of the quantum
/ classical interfaces is necessary to correctly understand the related security challenges. Let us
finally mention that, on the classical side of the interface only classical counter-measures, like the
ones implemented in smart-cards, can be proposed. It follows from this argument that the expertise
of side-channels gathered on classical crypto-systems will remain crucial for the implementation
of quantum crypto-systems.
There is one additional argument that illustrates another advantage of adopting a quantum
description of crypto-systems in the perspective of side-channel attacks: by testing for some fun-
damental quantum statistical behaviour, like the non-local correlation properties involved in Bell
Inequalities (BI) violations [3], one can 16 relate BI violations with the absence of side-channels, i.e.
one can experimentally test and verify that the Hilbert space in which the quantum phenomena
are controlled and observed is not leaking information towards another Hilbert space and thus to
a potential eavesdropper [96]. This property is very fundamental and has absolutely no classical
counterpart. It is indeed this property that is used in the derivations of the unconditional security
proofs of QKD against arbitrary quantum attacks [41, 42]. The beauty of this property is that it
can be, in principle, tested experimentally: one can experimentally prove that there exists no in-
formation leakage from a set of maximally entangled states, and thus no side-channel. Based on
this idea, it has been recently shown [118] that one can propose and prove the security of some
so-called “device-independent quantum cryptography” schemes, where the influence of all the
possible side-channels of QKD hardware is taken care of within the security proof. The derivation
made within Ref. [118] indeed demonstrates that side-channel-resistant positive secret key rate
could be obtained in practical QKD systems, provided one is able to violate Bell Inequalities in the
loophole-free regime17
It is by essence impossible to extend such side-channel-resistance properties to classical crypto-
graphic systems, because any classical message can be duplicated and cloned without any pertur-
bation. It appears to us fascinating to notice that some very deep aspects of quantum information
tools, like the loophole-free Bell Inequalities testing [97], that happen to be at the heart of quantum
theory foundations, are seemingly bound to play an important role in the future development of
secure cryptographic hardware.
6.2. Cryptographic certification of quantum crypto-systems
Even though we have argued that a quantum perspective on physical side-channels can be
promising, we however do not claim that current quantum crypto-systems are superior to the clas-
sical ones with respect to side-channel vulnerability. Indeed, as pointed out by Michael Nielsen
[98], quantum crypto-systems are currently lacking one essential element needed in modern cryp-
tography, namely historical security: one can have confidence in a crypto-system only after this
system has been intensively tested, and attacked and validated by a large number of experts and
users. It is clear that currentQKD implementation cannot claim any kind of historical security, since
very few teams have a QKD system at their disposal and even fewer teams have tried to attack the
potential weaknesses of real QKD systems. Some pioneering work has however been initiated in
16under the assumption that such Bell Inequalities violations can be tested in what is called the loophole-free regime
which remains currently an experimental challenge in quantum communications
17the appropriate set-up for such a "loophole-free" test and thus of device-independent QKD is feasible in principle, but
is not available presently.
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the direction of testing implementation vulnerabilities of quantum crypto-systems already some
years ago [106] and this line of research is currently gaining momentum [107, 108].
We indeed believe that it is now time for amore systematic andwide-spread testing of QKD sys-
tems , as well as for the establishment of security standards and certification procedures. This work
has already started within the SECOQC project, within the Certification sub-project [99]. More-
over, an industry standardization group on QKD based on the outcome of the SECOQC project
has been launched in October 2008. It is hosted by the European Telecommunications Standards
Institute (ETSI), and shall bring together the important actors from science and industry in order to
converge towards industry standards for QKD, including standards concerning the cryptographic
certification of QKD hardware implementations.
6.3. Post Quantum Computing Cryptography
As noted in [94], “If powerful quantum computers could be built, most asymmetric crypto-
graphic protocols in use todaywould no longer be secure, which would present a serious challenge
for open networks and cryptographers should be prepared for this situation”.
Beyond the Classical Information-Theoretic Key Establishment (CITKE) schemes discussed in
2.1, the fast-growing knowledge accumulated on Quantum Computation can be used to design
new public-key schemes and study their resilience to Quantum Computing attacks. One can in-
deed construct classical public-key schemes based on the lattice shortest-vector problem[21]. Build-
ing a public-key scheme on such a problemwould be extremely inefficient in terms of performance,
however, since one can find lattice problems in Quantum NP [93], public-key crypto-systems that
would derive from it would not be threatened by any potential speed-up on a quantum computer.
There also exist other classical public-key crypto-systems, that are conjectured to resist quan-
tum computers such as the NTRU encryption system 18, or the McEliece encryption system, based
on coding theory [20]. Note however that even though there exist no known quantum algorithm
able to attack efficiently these last two problems, neither NTRU or McEliece public-key are proven
to be difficult problems (of super-polynomial complexity) on a quantum computer. Indeed, as
noted in [110] the question of whether the complexity classes related to mathematical problems
are ultimately different on a quantum computer than what they are classically remains essentially
an open question. There are even some indications leading to partially answer negatively to this
question: as demonstrated in [109] oraclemethods can be used to give evidence that the complexity
class NP is not included in BQP (which contains the problems that can be considered as efficiently
solvable on a quantum computer). This last result, even though it does not constitute a definitive
proof, nevertheless indicates that the classical problems of asymmetric cryptography that are cur-
rently known to be efficiently solvable on a quantum computer (RSA, discrete logarithm, elliptic
curve cryptography, etc.) could indeed also be relatively easy on a classical computer, and thus
could already be seriously at stake today (and not only when large quantum computers would be
developed).
Post-quantum computing cryptography is thus an extremely important and stimulating re-
search field, not only for the cryptography of tomorrow, but also for the cryptography of today.
We believe moreover that this field is an ideal opportunity for close collaboration between com-
puter scientists and physicists, both interested in quantum information, and that such research
will continue to be extremely fertile, as it has already proven to be over the past years [22].
6.4. Classical Cryptographic Primitives built on top of QKD networks
QKD networks as the one developed within SECOQC can be considered, from the application
point of view, as a “new security infrastructure”; we also believe that it can be interesting to con-
sider such networks from a purely theoretical point of view, as “new cryptographic primitives”,
allowing the distribution of unconditionally secure keys, among a network of trusted centres con-
nected by QKD links.
It seems indeed natural to examine what new classical cryptographic protocols could be built
on top of such networks, beyond global pair-wise Key Distribution. As already proposed by Louis
18algorithm presented as an alternative to RSA and whose security is claimed to be related to solving shortest vector
problem in a high-dimensional lattice [111]. However, the security of NTRU is still not considered as well established
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Salvail in [89], such QKD networks could be, in the bounded quantum-storage model [105], com-
bined with Oblivious Transfer in order to allow unconditionally secure multi-party computations.
One can also study the efficiency of secret sharing schemes over such new cryptographic infras-
tructure. An important work has already been lead on that topic (totally independently from QKD
networks considerations) [100, 101, 102, 103, 104]
This work strikingly seems to fit with the unconditional security offered by QKD networks,
and powerful information-theoretic tools have been developed to guarantee the security of such
networks even when some fraction of the network nodes are corrupted. We believe that this opens
promising research perspectives in the domain of unconditionally secure networks.
7. Conclusion
QKD is currently the only known cryptographic technique that has lead to secret key agreement
protocols for which the unconditional security can be formally established. Since the first QKD
protocol, BB84, proposed 25 years ago [39] , prolific theoretical and experimental research work
has been conducted. Quantum cryptography has rapidly become an established academic topic
within quantum information science, while QKD technologies have continuously moved forward
in terms of performance and reliability.
The significant progresses achieved through the coordinated collective efforts of the consortium
of partners in the European project SECOQC and materialized by the final live demonstration of
the real QKD network deployed in the city of Vienna [116] have set an important milestone on
the road towards the industrialization of QKD. Indeed, one of the main collective achievements of
SECOQC has consisted in developing protocols, dedicated hardware and software, all compliant
with an original architecture based on the “network of secrets” concept, and to demonstrate that it
allows the integration of QKD into real security infrastructures.
The QKD community is nevertheless aware that the acknowledgement of these advances by
security experts and by leading classical cryptographers is likely to play a key role in the devel-
opment dynamics of a QKD industry and cannot be taken for granted. We therefore hope that
the skepticism expressed by some of the opinion leaders of the security industry[8, 9, 10, 11] can
gradually evolve into a more positive attitude, based on scientific discussions and confrontation of
ideas.
The main objective of this article was thus to discuss the applicability of QKD to some network
security scenarios and to present use cases where we believe that QKD can present advantages
with respect to the current existing solutions based on classical cryptography. We thus explained
that it could be interesting to use QKD in many different scenarios, ranging from data encryption
over a point-to-point link to security applications running over large networks with many users.
For all of these scenarios, we believe that the search of long-term security, that cannot really be
guaranteed by today’s cryptographic techniques, will be the driving reason to develop QKD-based
alternatives.
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